Fed up of not knowing what the
public think on Privacy, Security & Surveillance, post-Snowden? Confused by contradictory
polls? A new policy report by DATA-PSST and
DCSS summarises a range of polls and in-depth studies since 2013. It makes
observations and recommendations that will be of great interest to anyone
legislating or campaigning on Privacy, Security and Surveillance, and wishing
to retain public trust.
Is the public prepared to give up privacy for security?
Edward
Snowden’s revelations in June
2013 prompted major debates around the topics of privacy, national
security, and mass digital surveillance.
Within these debates, the British government and its intelligence
agencies regularly invoke British public opinion as:
a) desiring
greater security, and;
b)
probably being prepared to give up privacy to enhance security.
But what does
the public actually think on privacy, security and the Snowden leaks? Is the
public prepared to give up privacy for security?
Studies consulted
To answer these questions, this report
draws on the following studies:
-
The ongoing Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society
Project (DCSS) at Cardiff
University into UK public opinion on the Snowden leaks, comprising analysis of
opinion polls and in-depth focus groups with different demographics of the
public in England and Wales.
-
The published in-depth, participatory study, Surveillance,
Privacy and Security (SurPRISE), of
2000 citizens from nine European countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom) on attitudes towards surveillance-oriented security
technologies and privacy (Pavone
et al. 2015).
-
Published advertising industry studies (opinion
polls) on privacy and commercial surveillance.
Synthesising these studies, we
provide the following observations and recommendations.
Observations
1. Unlike the UK government, the British public sees bulk data collection as constituting mass surveillance.
2.
The topics of UK
state surveillance of digital communications and online privacy matter to the
British, and wider EU public. This is confirmed by opinion poll data since 2013
and in-depth studies.
3.
The EU and UK public think some surveillance technologies
are useful/effective for combating national security threats, and should be
used, but acceptability varies according to whether the surveillance is of communications
or bodies, and blanket or targeted. Surveillance of physical bodies (smart
CCTV) and targeted surveillance of digital communications (smartphone location
tracking) are more accepted than blanket surveillance of digital communications
(deep packet inspection).
4.
The EU and UK public think that although certain
surveillance technologies are useful/effective for combating national security
threats, they compromise human rights and are abused by security agencies.
These concerns especially apply to deep packet inspection.
5.
In the UK, those
under 60 see UK state surveillance of digital communications as going too far,
and an infringement upon the right to privacy. Over 60s do not. This finding is
echoed by EU-wide studies.
6. In the UK, it is younger people & ethnic minorities who are most concerned about lack of transparency & consent when it comes to state surveillance of digital communications.
7. There are identifiable criteria for what makes security-oriented surveillance technologies acceptable for EU publics. Targeted rather than blanket surveillance is preferred, as are clear communications to citizens about what is going on, with strong regulatory oversight.
8.
All age groups
in the UK, especially those over 55, are strongly concerned about commercial
surveillance, and increasingly take concrete steps to defend against intrusive
behaviour by advertising companies. This suggests that if people could do more about state surveillance,
they would.
9. There are
a range of tools and behaviour change open to people to defend against state
surveillance.
Recommendations
1.
Given
Observation 1, the UK government has more work to do if it wants to persuade
the British public that Bulk Data Collection is different to mass digital
surveillance.
2.
Given
Observation 2, the UK government should take into consideration public views on
digital surveillance and privacy.
3.
Given
Observation 3, the UK government has a public mandate to use some
surveillance technologies for combating national security threats. However this
mandate is much weaker for blanket surveillance of digital communications (deep
packet inspection) than more targeted surveillance of digital communications
(smartphone location tracking) or surveillance of physical bodies (Smart CCTV).
4.
Observation 4 shows that the UK government has more work to
do if it wants to persuade the British public that its security agencies do not
abuse their surveillance powers, especially concerning deep packet inspection.
Observations 5 and 6 show that the least persuaded are those under 60 and
ethnic minorities.
5.
Given
observation 7, governments seeking a popular mandate for digital surveillance
should ensure that such surveillance is targeted rather than blanket, accompanied by strong
regulatory oversight and clear communications to citizens about what is going
on.
6.
Given public
concerns over blanket digital surveillance, observation 8 which shows people
taking increasing action against commercial digital surveillance, and
observation 9 which shows that there are things people can use and do to
mitigate state surveillance, this suggests that unless the UK government
provides a digital surveillance architecture that is acceptable to its people,
it is quite possible that people will refuse this surveillance.
See Vian Bakir, Jonathan Cable, Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz,
Andrew McStay. (November
2015). Public Feeling on Privacy, Security
and Surveillance: A Report by DATA-PSST and DCSS. ESRC
